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The Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated 
Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a 
More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant 
Exception 
Benjamin C. Bair 
INTRODUCTION 
You are a state legislator. Your state's highway construction in-
dustry has seen better days, and unemployment is rising. Neverthe-
less, cities and counties in your state are hiring nonresident 
construction workers and buying cement and gravel from nonresi-
dent suppliers. Your constituents are upset that their tax dollars are 
going to outsiders, so you decide to draft a bill requiring all local 
governments1 in your state to fill at least half of their highway con-
struction positions with state residents. Is such a law valid under 
the Commerce Clause2 of the United States Constitution? 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as 
restricting the states' power to regulate interstate commerce, even 
when Congress has chosen not to regulate in a particular area.3 
More specifically, the Court has construed the Commerce Clause to 
proscribe states from discriminating economically against other 
states or from adopting regulatory legislation that burdens inter-
state commerce to a substantially greater extent than it provides 
local benefits.4 Because this restriction results from the Commerce 
Clause's unstated "negative" implications rather than its explicit 
command, it falls under the rubric of the "dormant Commerce 
1. "Local governments" include city governments, county governments, municipal gov-
ernments, school boards, or the governing bodies of any other political subdivisions of the 
state. 
2. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power to "regulate Com-
merce ••• among the several states." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
3. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has historically interpreted the Commerce Clause as 
limiting state regulatory power); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 {1988) {"It 
has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to 
regulate commerce among the states, but also directly limits the ability of the states to dis-
criminate against interstate commerce."); see also Case of the Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 
232 (1873) (adopting this interpretation of the Commerce Clause for the first time). 
4. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), states: 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose be found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. 
397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). 
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Clause."5 By interpreting "these great silences of the Constitu-
tion,"6 the Supreme Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause 
to strike down state laws that discriminate against nonresidents or 
that unduly burden interstate commerce.7 
The Supreme Court has created an exception to the dormant 
Commerce Clause, however, that grants states some power to dis-
criminate economically against nonresidents in favor of residents. 
This "market-participant" exception allows a state freely to adopt 
contracting preferences towards residents if the state participates in 
the market as the buying, hiring, or selling agent.8 Under this ex-
ception, the Supreme Court has upheld state laws favoring residents 
when a state purchases scrap metal,9 buys printing services, 10 sells 
cement,11 or hires construction workers.12 Local governments can 
also adopt laws preferring residents for such public contracts.13 
It remains unclear under the dormant Commerce Clause 
whether a state government may adopt a "state-mandated prefer-
ence law" - a law requiring local governments within the state to 
prefer state residents for public contracts.14 Many states have en-
5. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74; LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw § 6-2, at 403 {2d ed. 1988). 
6. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mand, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
7. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 {1978) (holding unconstitutional a 
New Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste originated or 
collected outside the state); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding uncon-
stitutional a Madison, WISconsin ordinance that prohibited the sale of milk unless bottled 
within five miles of the city); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 {1935) {holding 
unconstitutional a New York statute that set a minimum price for milk sold in the state by 
nonresident producers). 
8. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (distinguishing between "States as 
market-participants and States as market regulators"). 
9. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
10. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (MD. Fla.), affd., 409 U.S. 
904 {1973). 
11. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446-47. 
12. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
13. See White, 460 U.S. at 214-15 (holding that a city spending its own money on public 
contracts may have hiring preferences for city residents because it is a market participant). 
14. "Public contracts" include hiring for public construction jobs, purchasing goods with 
public funds, or selling goods made from public funds. "Preferring" residents or adopting 
"in-state preferences" means giving residents some advantage in obtaining public contracts. 
The hiring preference statute involved in W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 
(7th Cir. 1984), provides a useful example of a state-mandated preference law. The statute in 
that case stated that the contractor on " 'any public works project or improvement for the 
State of Illinois or any political subdivision •.. thereof shall employ only Illinois laborers on 
such project or improvement,' unless the contractor certifies ..• that Illinois laborers either 
'are not available, or are incapable of performing the particular type of work involved.'" 730 
F.2d at 489 (quoting Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 'I 271 (1981)). Violation of the preference law 
was a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum jail sentence of 30 days and a maximum fine 
of $500. 730 F.2d at 489 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, i 274; ch. 38, i'f l005-8-3(a)(3), 1005-
9-l(a)(3) (1981)). 
This Note only examines the federal constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws. 
State constitutional or legislative limitations, particularly self-government and home-rule pro-
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acted such preference laws,1s but the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals are split as to whether the Constitution permits them. The 
Seventh Circuit struck down a state-mandated preference law 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.16 In contrast, the Ninth and 
Third Circuits upheld state-mandated preference laws as constitu-
tional under the dormant Commerce Clause.17 The dispute be-
tween the circuits centers on the characterization of the relationship 
between the state and local governments within the state. The 
Ninth and Third Circuits followed the traditional view that local 
governments are merely dependent political subdivisions.18 Thus, 
they held that the state acts as a market-participant when it enacts a 
state-mandated preference law.19 The Seventh Circuit repudiated 
this traditional view and decided that the local government in the 
case before it possessed substantial autonomy from the state gov-
ernment. Thus, it held that the state acts as a market regulator, 
which is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
visions, may restrict the adoption of such laws. See, e.g., Novak v. Perk, 413 N.E.2d 784, 786 
(Ohio 1980) (stating that "municipal exercises of authority which involve powers of local self· 
government ordinarily prevail over general state laws"); Portland v. Welch, 59 P.2d 228, 231 
(Or. 1936) (stating that "[t]he object and purpose of such constitutional provision is to pre-
vent legislative interference and intermeddling with purely municipal affairs"); see also 1 
CHEsrER J. ANTIEAu ET AL., MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW§ 3.01, at 7 (1995) ("Home rule 
is important to cities in two principal ways. First as a source of municipal power. Secondly, 
as a limitation upon legislative control."); cf. Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco, 
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the city charter partially invalidated a city ordi-
nance preferring locally-owned businesses in city contracting). 
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 36.15.050(a) (1994); CAL. GOVT, CODE § 4331 (West 1966); 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 'l'i 269-74 (1981); KAN. STAT. § 75-3740 (1969). 
Risk averse states can take the path chosen by Ohio. Instead of mandating preferences 
on local governments, Ohio developed a model system of preferences that any local govern-
ment may voluntarily adopt. See Omo ADMIN. CooE 123:5-1-32 (1994) (adopted pursuant 
to Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 125.111 (Anderson 1994)). Ohio based the model preference on 
a state-level preference law already in existence. Omo REv. CooE ANN.§§ 125.09, 125.111 
(Anderson 1994). This path may not achieve all of the beneficial effects sought by the state, 
but it would be constitutionally permissible because cities are currently free to adopt their 
own preferences. White, 460 U.S. at 204. 
16. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496-98 (7th Cir. 1984}. 
17. See Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992); 'Ii'ojan 
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 
(1991). The statute in Trojan Technologies was actually a buy-American law rather than a 
state resident preference, but this fact did not alter the court's analysis of the market-partici-
pant issue. See 916 F.2d at 909-12. This fact does matter, however, under the test this Note 
proposes. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 
215 (1984); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that a state "may with· 
hold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small [the 
municipality's] sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State exercising and holding 
powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will."); see also 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 14, 
§ 2.00 (discussing the nearly complete control by states of municipalities); infra notes 45-46 
and accompanying text. 
19. See Big Country, 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911-12. 
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when it adopts a state-mandated preference law, at-least when that 
law applies to an autonomous local government.20 
This Note argues that the current focus on the relationship be-
tween states and their local governments as the key determinant of 
the constitutional validity of state-mandated preference laws is 
fl.awed. Instead, a court considering the validity of a state-man-
dated preference law should uphold such a law only if it distributes 
the benefits of state expenditures to state residents and does not 
excessively burden interstate commerce. 
Part I describes dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the 
market-participant exception. This Part then argues that courts 
currently evaluate whether to apply the market-participant excep-
tion to state-mandated preference laws based on whether they char-
acterize the local governments affected by the law as politically 
dependent subdivisions of the state or as autonomous entities. Part 
II examines the theoretical rationales for the market-participant ex-
ception and argues that the moral and political entitlement of state 
residents to state funds, and the built-in spending restraints of 
resident-preference laws, are the rationales that actually justify the 
market-participant exception and define its scope. This Part then 
applies these rationales to state-mandated preference laws and ar-
gues that courts should uphold some of these laws under the 
market-participant exception. This Part also explains why the cur-
rent focus on state-local government relationships fails to identify 
those state-mandated preference laws that are supported by the ra-
tionales for the market-participant exception. Part m draws on 
dormant Commerce Clause and Privilege and Immunities Clause21 
jurisprudence and concludes that under the market-participant ex-
ception to the dormant Commerce Clause, a court should permit a 
particular state-mandated preference law if the state is spending the 
funds of its own residents, if no nondiscriminatory alternatives ex-
ist, and if the law's burden on interstate commerce does not sub-
stantially outweigh its local benefit. 
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE MARKET-
PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION, AND THE CURRENT 
APPROACH TO STATE-MANDATED 
PREFERENCE LAWS 
Because state-mandated preference laws interfere with inter-
state commerce and discriminate economically against nonresi-
dents, such laws may violate the dormant Commerce Clause. If 
20. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 495. 
21. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CoNST. art. 
IV, §2. 
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state-mandated preferences are to pass constitutional muster under 
current law, they must fall within the market-participant exception 
to the dormant Commerce Clause. Section I.A summarizes dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Section I.B then describes 
the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Finally, section I.C argues that courts currently evaluate 
whether to apply the market-participant exception to state-man-
dated preference laws based on how they characterize the relation-
ship between the state and the local governments within the state. 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state regulations that 
unnecessarily burden interstate commerce. Its main thrust is to 
preserve the national economy and to prevent the political and eco-
nomic balkanization of the states that occurred under the Articles 
of Confederation, when states fought destructive trade wars with 
each other.22 Although Commerce Clause doctrine has varied con-
siderably over time,23 the current test for state regulations under 
the dormant Commerce Clause focuses on two distinct elements. 
First, the state must be pursuing a legitimate state end,24 The 
Court generally has accepted health, safety, and welfare concerns as 
legitimate state ends,25 but it usually rejects economic concerns, 
particularly when the state economically discriminates in favor of 
22. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335-36 
(1995) (stating that "the Commerce Clause's purpose [is] preventing a State from retreating 
into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole" and citing 
numerous historical references relating to the prevention of economic balkanization that oc-
curred under the Articles of Confederation); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 
533-35 (stating that the Framers designed the Commerce Clause to protect "the peace and 
safety of the Union" and to promote "solidarity and prosperity"); see also Letter of February 
13, 1829, from James Madison to J.C. Cabell, in 3 THE RECORDS OF nm FEDERAL CONVEN· 
noN OF 1787, at 478 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (stating that the Commerce Clause "grew out of 
the abuse of the power by the importing States in trucing the non-importing, and was intended 
as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves"). 
23. Initially, the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between "local" regulations 
pursuant to the state's police power and "national" regulations that required uniform treat-
ment. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Later, the Court 
attempted to distinguish between regulations that "directly" or "indirectly" affected inter· 
state commerce. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917); Smith v. 
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888). The Court eventually abandoned this approach in NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301U.S.1 (1937), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), for more empirically based tests. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 5-4. For the current test 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, see infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. 
24. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
25. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (recognizing that protecting the state's 
baitfish population was a legitimate objective); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (hold· 
ing that states may require nonresident suppliers of cattle to certify that the cattle are free of 
Bang's disease). 
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residents over nonresidents.26 One of the primary motivations for 
protecting nonresidents from such discriminatory measures is that 
they are not represented in the political process of the discriminat-
ing state. Therefore, they have no way of protecting themselves 
from the adverse economic effects of other states' regulations.27 
The Court has upheld even facially discriminatory statutes, how-
ever, when the proffered justifications were sufficiently important.28 
If a court determines that the state is pursuing a legitimate state 
end, then it will measure whether the burden of the regulation on 
interstate commerce substantially outweighs the putative local ben-
efi.t. 29 In performing this analysis, the court may look to whether 
the state could have adopted any less discriminatory or less burden-
26. See Lewis v. BT Investment Mgrs., Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (holding unconstitutional 
a statute that prevented nonresident banks and bank holding companies from owning a resi-
dent investment advisory firm); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 
U.S. 333 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a statute that required nonresident producers of 
apples to repack their product or change their labeling); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkston, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994) (stating that "[d]iscrimination against inter-
state commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow 
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has 
no other means to advance a legitimate local interest"); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that "simple economic protectionism" is subject to a virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity). 
27. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981) (rejecting the 
presumption that "a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly bur-
densome regulations" when those regulations discriminate against interstate commerce); 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) ("[T]he Court has often recog-
nized that to the extent ••. the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it 
is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted 
when interests within the state are affected."); see also TRIBE, supra note 5: 
In [the dormant Commerce Clause] context, the rhetoric of judicial deference to demo-
cratically fashioned judgments of legislatures is often inapposite. The checks on which 
we rely to curb the abuse of legislative power - election and recall - are simply un-
available to those who have no effective voice or vote in the jurisdiction which harms 
them ..•• Whatever may be the general merit of a system of judicial review which sanc-
tions intervention by the counter-democratic courts only when the normal processes of 
democracy have broken down, that model is of little use if mechanically applied in the 
context of interstate commerce, where problems often arise precisely because the indi-
vidual state's democratic processes have worked well 
Id. § 6-5, at 409 (citation omitted). 
28. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a ban on the importation of live 
baitfish infected with parasites). 
29. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Some members of the Court 
disfavor balancing in the dormant Commerce Clause context See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the balancing test is 
"ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all"); Kassel, 450 U.S. 
at 691-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the balancing test could lead to anomalous 
results in similar cases); see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection-
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1101-08, 1197 
(1986) (arguing that the Court, despite its language, actually has not performed any balancing 
and should not do so except in the context of the market-participant exception). The Pike 
test remains the law, however. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 114 S. Ct. 
1677, 1682 (1994). 
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some altematives.3o On the one hand, if the state cannot present 
sufficient evidence that the regulation provides a substantial and 
legitimate local benefit, especially if the statute discriminates 
against nonresidents, then the court will usually strike down the 
statute as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.31 On the 
other hand, if the state can present evidence that the statute 
presents only a small burden, particularly when that burden applies 
to both residents and nonresidents equally, then the court will prob-
ably uphold the law.32 
B. The Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Under the market-participant exception to the dormant Com-
merce Clause, a state may burden commerce or even facially dis-
criminate against nonresidents whenever it engages in "direct ... 
participation in the market. "33 The Supreme Court created the ex-
ception in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 34 in which it upheld a 
30. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that while the state could 
legitimately protect its minnow supply, it had not tried to do so in a nondiscriminatory fash-
ion); A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (holding that if other states refuse to 
accept Mississippi milk, Mississippi's remedy should be a court challenge rather than exclu-
sion of the discriminatory state's milk); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 
(1951) (stating that the state could have protected residents from tainted milk without com-
pletely prohibiting the importation of milk into the city). 
31. See, e.g., Kosse~ 450 U.S. at 662 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on the use of 
trucks longer than 65 feet because it disproportionately affected nonresidents); City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a regulation that prohib-
ited the importation of solid waste from nonresidents); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 
U.S. 761 (1945) (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on the use of longer trains than com-
mon in Arizona because the improvement in safety was marginal compared to the restriction 
on interstate commerce). 
32. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) 
(holding constitutional a prohibition on the use of particularly heavy trucks because the regu-
lation affected both intrastate and interstate traffic). But see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (holding unconstitutional a nondiscriminatory regulation requiring cer-
tain mudguards because the safety advantages were unclear). 
Technically, courts have examined a third element: whether the proposed regulation is 
rationally related to the state's legitimate objective. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 191-92. 
Practically, however, this requirement is empty. The Court has expressed its willingness to 
defer to legislative decisions for this requirement. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 189-92. 
Moreover, the examination of less discriminatory alternatives will ensure that the regulation 
not only rationally relates to the state's objective but also that it achieves that objective bet-
ter than other regulations. 
33. White v •. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983) (quot-
ing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
34. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Arguably, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 
(1972), was the first case in which the Court recognized a distinction between state regulation 
and state market activity. In Askew, a panel of three district court judges upheld under the 
Commerce Clause a Florida statute requiring all public printing for the state to be done 
within the state. 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The Supreme Court merely af-
firmed the opinion of the panel, however, without explaining its specific reasoning. 409 U.S. 
at 904. 
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Maryland statute that promised a cash "bounty" to scrap processors 
licensed by the state for the destruction of any vehicle formerly ti-
tled in Maryland. The Court held that when the state eschews its 
role as a government entity and enters the market as a "private 
actor," as Maryland did when it offered to buy the vehicles, then 
the dormant Commerce Clause does not govern it activities.35 
Under this market-participant exception, the Court has also upheld 
a state's ability to sell state-produced cement preferentially to resi-
dents36 and to hire residents over nonresidents for public construc-
tion projects.37 
The Court has created two notable limitations on the applicabil-
ity of the market-participant exception. In South-Central Timber 
Development v. Wunnicke, 38 Alaska adopted a requirement that all 
successful bidders on state-owned timber resources partially pro-
cess the timber in Alaska prior to shipping it out of the state.39 The 
Supreme Court held that this "primary manufacture" requirement 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the state was at-
tempting to control the post-contractual disposition of the timber. 
The Court explained that this "downstream restriction" made the 
market-participant exception inapplicable because the state was at-
tempting to govern separate, private economic relationships.40 In 
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 41 an Ohio statute provided a tax credit 
for sales of Ohio-produced ethanol. It did not provide that credit 
for ethanol produced in another state, however, unless that state 
had a reciprocal tax credit for Ohio-produced ethanol.42 The 
Supreme Court struck down the statute, stating that taxation is a 
"primeval government activity" that is not analogous to private 
market activity.43 Thus, the market-participant exception generally 
will not apply to any state activity that comes closer to traditional 
government functions like regulation or taxation, although it is far 
from clear how courts should make this distinction in specific cases. 
C. State-Mandated Preference Laws and the Market-Participant 
Exception 
Courts applying the market-participant test to state-mandated 
preference laws have focused on the relationship between the state 
35. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 805-10. 
36. See Reeves, 441 U.S. at 429. 
37. See White, 460 U.S. at 214-15. 
38. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
39. See 461 U.S. at 84-86. 
40. 467 U.S. at 98-99. 
41. 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
42. See 486 U.S. at 271-73. 
43. 486 U.S. at 277. 
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passing such a law and its 19cal governments to determine the appli-
cability of the exception. Because the market-participant exception 
focuses on whether the state is "directly participating" in the mar-
ket or whether it is "regulating" the market,44 courts have at-
tempted to decide whether states are acting through their local 
governments as political agents or whether they are acting on their 
local governments' distinct contracting activity. There are essen-
tially" two different views of this relationship that courts have taken 
- the traditional view of local governments as "creatures of the 
state" and the more contemporary view of local governments as po-
tentially autonomous entities. 
Under traditional doctrine governing state-local relationships, 
states enacting state-mandated preference laws would always be 
acting as market-participants. Traditionally, courts viewed local 
governments as dependent "political subdivisions" or "creatures of 
the state."45 Applying this doctrine, a state enacting a state-
mandated preference law would merely be restricting the con-
tracting activity of one of its own political arms. All contracts with 
the Ideal government essentially would be contracts \vith the state. 
Therefore, under this interpretation, states enacting state-mandated 
preference laws would be "directly participating" in the market.46 
Under a more contemporary - and more complex - interpre-
tation of state-local relationships, states enacting state-mandated 
preference laws would be market participants only in certain cir-
cumstances. The Supreme Court often has treated local govern-
ments as distinct, separate entities from state governments. For 
example, local governments do not share state immunity from anti-
trust laws47 or section 1983 constitutional tort actions.48 In addi-
tion, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against local 
governments in federal court,49 and local governments are citizens 
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.so For the purpose of deter-
44. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. 
45. See, e.g., Wtlliams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of Trenton v. 
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); see also 1 .ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 2.00 (stressing that 
states have nearly complete control of local governments). See generally Carol F. Lee, The 
Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U. L. RBv. 1 
(1982). 
46. See, e.g., Big Country Foods v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 
1212 (1991). 
47. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
48. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
49. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); 
Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 563-66 (1900). 
50. See Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
Treating local governments as independent entities also comports more with legal and 
political reality. State constitutions often confer significant spheres of power to local govern-
ments through home-rule provisions. See supra note 14. Although home-rule provisions 
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mining the applicability of the market-participant exception to 
states enacting state-mandated preference laws, courts could evalu-
ate the autonomy of the particular local government entity affected 
by the law.51 If the local government is actually dependent, then 
the result should be the same as under traditional doctrine - the 
state is acting as a market participant. But, if the local government 
possesses substantial independence - through its ability to raise 
revenues or control its own affairs, for example - then the state 
would be regulating the economic activity of an independent actor 
and would not be a market participant.52 
Therefore, courts applying either the traditional or the more 
contemporary approach to state-local government relationships 
must focus on the dependence of the local government as the key to 
applying the market-participant exception to state-mandated pref-
erence laws. Courts applying the traditional approach assume de-
pendence, while courts applying the more contemporary approach 
actually measure dependence. Under both approaches, states man-
dating preferences on dependent local governments are acting as 
market participants, whereas states mandating preferences on au-
tonomous local governments are acting as regulators. 
There are two potential problems with treating state and local 
governments as a single market participant. One problem is that 
state governments often do not have formal privity of contract with 
local construction workers, which makes a state-mandated prefer-
ence law look more like regulation than direct market-participa-
tion. White v. Council of Construction Employers,53 however, 
suggests that formal privity is not necessary. In White, the mayor of 
Boston had issued an executive order requiring that all construction 
projects funded by the city have a work force composed of at least 
fifty percent Boston residents.54 The Council argued that the 
have not always been successful in guaranteeing local autonomy, see, e.g., Gerald Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv.1057, 1117 (1980); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits 
of Municipal Power Under Home Rule, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 652 (1964), such provisions 
have generally given local governments considerable lawmaking power. See Richard Brif-
fault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Gdvemment Law, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 
1, 9-18 (1990) (defending the effectiveness of home-rule provisions). 
51. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 493-98 (7th Cir. 1984); see 
also Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions, and the Mar-
ket Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 615, 627-28 
(1993) (suggesting that courts should measure the autonomy of a state's local governments to 
determine the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws). 
52. W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 495 ("The 'market participant' is the school board, just 
as the market participant in White was the city of Boston. The state is the regulator, telling 
thousands of local government units that they must not give construction contracts to em-
ployers of nonresidents."). 
53. 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
54. Interestingly, the executive order was based on a Massachusetts law that required 
each county, town, or district to prefer veterans and residents in hiring for public construc-
tion projects. See 460 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
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mayor's order reached beyond market participation because it in-
terfered with the contractual relations of two private parties -
public contractors and their employees. The Supreme Court re-
sponded that "the Commerce Clause does not require the city to 
stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract" because 
"[e]veryone affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal 
sense, 'working for the city.' "55 Therefore, it appears that formal 
privity between the contracting parties and the state is not neces-
sary for the market-participant exception to apply to state-
mandated preference laws.56 
Another potential and related problem with treating state and 
local governments as a single market participant is that state-
mandated preference laws appear to operate like the regulations 
that the Court struck down in South-Central Timber Development v. 
Wunnicke. 51 As mentioned earlier,58 South-Central limits the abil-
ity of states to impose "downstream restrictions" on its contracting 
partners, thereby effecting separate, private economic relationships. 
Because state-mandated preference laws restrict the ability of local 
governments to contract with construction workers and firms, ar-
guably such state laws pose invalid restrictions on the "down-
stream" local hiring market. A simple, but probably unsatisfying 
and somewhat circular, answer to this problem is that under the 
"arm-of-the-state" dependency theory, courts can view the state's 
mandated preference law as essentially affecting the state's own 
contractual relationships rather than those of a separate "down-
stream" entity. Thus, measuring the dependence or autonomy of 
local governments to determine whether the market-participant ex-
(citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 1982)). The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court also struck down this law when it invalidated the mayor's executive order. See Massa-
chusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346, 352-53 (Mass. 
1981). Because the Commonwealth did not appeal this part of the lower decision, the 
Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether a state-mandated preference is constitu-
tional. 460 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
SS. 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. But see 460 U.S. at 223 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that "[t]he 'sense' in which those affected by the Mayor's order 
'work for the city' ••• lack[s] substance altogether" because the state does not hire, fire, pay, 
or negotiate with construction workers or subcontractors). 
S6. Cf. Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
SOl U.S. 1212 (1991) (arguing by analogy that under a state-mandated preference law, suppli· 
ers of a local government are "supplying for the state"). The two situations are not perfectly 
analogous, however. The Supreme Court relied in White on the fact that the city was spend-
ing its own money. White, 460 U.S. at 214-lS {"Insofar as the city expended its own funds in 
entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a market participant •••• "). In 
White, the public contractor acted almost like an intermediary agent for the local govern-
ment, which supplied the actual payroll. Under some state-mandated preference laws, how-
ever, the state government does not supply funds, at least directly, to carry out the 
preferences. 
57. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
S8. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
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ception applies to state-mandated preference laws would be consis-
tent with current market-participant case law. 
A more complex, and more satisfactory, answer to whether 
state-mandated preference laws constitute downstream restrictions 
would require an examination of the rationales that justify the mar-
ket-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. For 
the market-participant exception to be what it purports to be - an 
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause - it must reflect the 
balance of values underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
dormant Commerce Clause protects the states' ability to enact le-
gitimate regulatory measures.s9 At the same time, it exists to pre-
vent trade wars and economic balkanization.60 Consequently, the 
rationales for the market-participant exception must allow only le-
gitimate regulations that do not excessively burden interstate com-
merce. If these rationales apply to state-mandated preference laws, 
then such laws should be constitutional under the market-partici-
pant exception. If these rationales do not apply, however, then 
courts should strike such laws down as impermissible downstream 
restrictions. 
II. STATE-MANDATED PREFERENCE LAWS, STATE-LoCAL 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE RATIONALES FOR THE 
MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Although the market-participant exception to the dormant 
Commerce Clause seems to represent an appropriate accommoda-
tion to state regulatory power in the abstract, defining its exact jus-
tification and scope has confounded the Supreme Court and 
numerous commentators. In fact, many commentators have urged 
the Court to abolish the exception.61 Nevertheless, two rationales 
59. See supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
61. See South-Central Tlnlber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) ("In my view, Justice White's treatment of the market-participant doctrine and 
the response of Justice Rehnquist point up the inherent weakness of the doctrine."); Swin 
Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 262 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, CJ., dissent-
ing); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. lu.. U. LJ. 73, 76-77; A. Dan 
Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling 
America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 111, 133 (1983); Tlnlothy P. Collins, Case-
note, 27 WAYNE L REv. 1575, 1590 (1981); Carol A. Fortine, Note, The Commerce Clause 
and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
601 (1982); Greer L. Phillips, Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State Proprietary 
Activities: Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 365 (1981); Adam B. Schiff, 
Comment, State Discriminatory Action Against Nonresidents: Using the Original Position 
Theory as a Framework for Analysis, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 583, 587 (1985); William L. 
Thorpe, Note, State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review - Hughes 
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L REV. 893, 901 (1977). 
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have emerged that both justify the market-participant exception 
and define its scope - the moral and political entitlement of state 
residents to the benefit of state funds and the built-in spending re-
straints of resident contractual preference laws. These two ratio-
nales identify how resident preference laws have a legitimate 
justification and how they do not always burden commerce 
excessively. 
Section II.A describes these rationales in detail and argues that 
they provide a benchmark against which courts should evaluate 
whether the market-participant exception applies to state-man-
dated preference laws. Section Il.B then applies these two ratio-
nales to state-mandated preference laws and concludes that 
although not all such laws are justifiable under these rationales, the 
market-participant exception should nevertheless apply to some 
state-mandated preference laws. Section II.C argues, however, that 
the current application of the market-participant exception to state-
mandated preference laws - by focusing on state-local relation-
ships - fails to adequately distinguish between laws that comport 
with the rationales of the market participant exception and those 
that do not. This section demonstrates the need for courts to de-
velop a different application of the market-participant exception to 
state-mandated preference laws. 
A. The Rationales for the Market-Participant Exception 
The Supreme Court and various legal commentators have sug-
gested many possible rationales for the market-participant excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause. Only two of these 
rationales, however, actually justify the exception and define its 
scope. First, preferring residents when spending their money is a 
legitimate state objective as a matter of moral and political theory. 
Second, preferences that require the expenditure of state funds 
have built-in restraints that may make them less politically and eco-
noµrically divisive than other discriminatory state laws. Both of 
these rationales actually focus on the concerns of the dormant 
Commerce Clause - protecting legitimate regulation while avoid-
ing excessive burdens on interstate commerce. The other rationales 
either fail to provide sufficient guidance for lower courts to define 
the limits of the exception, or they fail completely to justify the 
exception. 
The Supreme Court itself may have misgivings about the market-participant exception. 
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988}, the Court held that a tax credit given by 
the state of Ohio to promote the sale of ethanol fell under the state's "distinctive governmen-
tal capacity," making the market-participant exception inapplicable. 486 U.S. at 277. The 
solution, however, is not to replace one empty label - "market participant" - with another 
- "distinctive governmental capacity." 
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Moral and political theory suggests that states may legitimately 
prefer their own citizens in public contracting because they are 
spending state funds. The money that states spend comes mostly 
from residents through various taxes, tolls, and levies. Thus, these 
residents have a greater claim to the benefit of these resources than 
nonresidents do.62 Some commentators have referred to this justifi-
cation as the "sow-and-reap" rationale63 or the "Lockean labor-de-
sert theoryt64 because the residents have labored to earn money 
that they then "sow" in the form of taxes to the state. When the 
state later spends this "sown" money, residents deserve to "reap" 
the benefits of those expenditures. In other words, states should be 
able to allocate expenditures of state funds to residents before non-
residents. Other forms of interstate discrimination, such as taxes 
and tariffs on nonresidents, do not require the state to spend any 
62. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980): 
The State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is "protectionist" only in 
the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state 
treasury and whom the State was created to serve .... Such policies, while perhaps 
"protectionist" in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable pur-
pose of state government - to serve the citizens of the state. 
447 U.S. at 442; see also Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 421 (1989); Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-
95; Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 523 
(1981). 
Professor Laurence Tribe has offered a variation on this theory that focuses on whether 
the state "created" the commerce at issue. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHmcES 
146 (1985) ("The principle that necessarily underlies the market participant-market regulator 
distinction is that, when the state is c;reating commerce that would otherwise not exist, it has 
greater freedom to shape that commerce than when it is merely intruding into a previously 
existing market."). The Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected this rationale in Reeves, 
447 U.S. at 446 n.18, and some commentators have criticized its explanatory power. See 
Coenen, supra, at 410-13 (arguing that Professor Tribe's commerce creation rationale is un-
derinclusive because it cannot explain Alexandria Scrap and Reeves). 
Another variation that exists on this rationale involves treating the state like a "private 
actor" because it is spending its own money. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 51, at 627-28; Wil-
liam L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Dispo· 
sal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVrL. L.J. 779, 
803 (1988); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (arguing, in support of 
the market-participant exception, that states have the same right as private parties to choose 
their trading partners and that states face the same limitations as private market partici-
pants). Professor Tribe points out that there is a certain irony in using the private-party 
image to justify the state's ability to promote the welfare of its citizens. See TRIBE, supra 
note 5, § 6-11, at 432. Moreover, Professor Karl Manheim observes that analogizing state 
activity to private behavior might spawn exceptions, such as the state as monopolist. See Karl 
Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market-Participant Doctrine, 22 Aruz. ST. L.J. 559, 
608 (1990); cf. Clark, supra note 51, at 629-32 (applying antitrust concepts to the private party 
model). Ultimately, the "private party" label seems as conclusory as the current "market 
participant" label because it fails to account for the rationales supporting the market-partici-
pant exception. 
63. Coenen, supra note 62, at 421-26. 
64. Varat, supra note 62, at 522-23. Professor Varat recognizes that limitations may exist 
on a state's ability to exclude nonresidents on this rationale. If a state possesses an overabun-
dance of resources and exclusion of nonresidents will unnecessarily disrupt the economy, the 
resident preference should be impermissible. This is particularly true when the nonresident 
offers to pay her fair share of state taxes. Id. at 531-36. 
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taxpayer-contributed money. Therefore, preferential state spend-
ing is more legitimate morally and politically than discriminatory 
taxes or tariffs. 
Contractual preferences for residents are also less likely than 
other discriminatory regulations to place excessive burdens on in-
terstate commerce. Discriminatory taxes and tariffs appear to cost 
the state very little to enact or administer because they either pro-
duce income or merely reduce tax revenues.6s Contractual prefer-
ences and subsidies,66 conversely, have, as Professor Donald Regan 
has argued, built-in restraints because they require the expenditure 
of limited state funds.67 This means that contractual preferences 
will be more expensive to create and administer than discriminatory 
taxes and tariffs, so they are more likely to be limited in scope. 68 In 
addition, discriminatory taxes and tariffs encourage retaliation from 
other states, creating a "race-to-the-bottom" situation that might 
eventually hamper or destroy free trade. 69 Contractual preferences 
are less likely to engender such retaliation because other states may 
recognize the political legitimacy of a state preferring its own resi-
dents with state funds.10 Both the "expensiveness" of spending 
preferences and the lesser likelihood of retaliation are "built-in re-
straints" in the sense that they are natural components of spending 
preferences that pose less of a burden on interstate commerce than 
other discriminatory measures. 
Naturally, neither of these rationales justifies all contractual 
preferences. In many instances, the state may be spending money 
that it cannot completely attribute to its own residents. For exam-
65. In fact, most discriminatory measures rarely have beneficial effects and often impose 
administrative and efficiency costs that states can never recoup. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUEL-
SON, EcoNoMics 679 (10th ed. 1977) (making this argument in the context of international 
trade). 
66. Although the Supreme Court has never had to decide whether subsidies are constitu-
tional under the dormant Commerce Clause, it has indicated general approval of such meas-
ures. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 & n.15 (1994); New 
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 
2220 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court implicitly upheld subsidies in a market-
participant case, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)). But see Regan, 
supra note 29, at 1196 (arguing that the Court should not uphold subsidies because such 
measures can easily distort the market). 
67. See Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95. Of course, even contractual preferences create 
economic inefficiency. See, e.g., Donald E. Jordan, Comment, In-State Preferences in Public 
Contracting: States' Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. CoLO. L. RBv. 205, 216 
(1978) (discussing the questionable benefits of contractual preferences). A simple example 
can help demonstrate this phenomenon. If a nonresident can complete a contract for 
$100,000, whereas a resident will charge $120,000, then a resident preference will create an 
inefficiency of $20,000 on the contract. 
68. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 434-35 (stating that while discriminatory taxes and sub-
sidies are also "expensive," the costs are often hidden; thus, residents will be more likely to 
vote for such laws than for contractual preferences); Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95. 
69.' See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 127-30 (1993). 
70. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 433-44; Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95. 
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ple, the money may come from federal subsidies or from taxes or 
licensing fees paid by nonresidents. Moreover, even when the state 
is spending money derived from its own residents for contractual 
preferences, some economic inefficiencies will result, and other 
states still may retaliate with their own discriminatory preferences, 
taxes, or subsidies.71 Consequently, courts should strike down 
those contractual preferences that create large inefficiencies or un-
necessarily risk retaliation. Nevertheless, these two rationales ex-
plain why it is logical in light of the concerns underlying the 
dormant Commerce Clause to use a mechanism like the market-
participant exception to differentiate at least some contractual pref-
erences from other discriminatory measures. 
Two other rationales for the market-participant exception do 
provide some theoretical support for exception, but they fail to de-
fine its scope clearly and thus they fail to provide any guidelines for 
lower courts. First, the Supreme Court has stated that the political 
nature of state proprietary activity makes congressional action 
more appropriate than judicial intervention.72 Second, the Court 
has expressed concern that restraining the states' ability to enact 
preference laws would impinge on their traditional role as experi-
mental laboratories.73 Both of these rationales - essentially en-
couraging judicial restraint and respect for federalism - are 
appropriate considerations in light of the entitlement and built-in 
restraint rationales discussed above. Because residents are more 
entitled to the benefit of their own resources, courts should be more 
reluctant to strike resident-preference laws down. In addition, be-
cause these laws have fewer negative effects on interstate com-
merce, states should have greater freedom to enact such laws and 
structure them in ways most beneficial to state residents. 
Neither of the Supreme Court's rationales, however, provides a 
satisfactory guide to distinguishing between constitutional and un-
constitutional preference laws. As Professor Dan Coenen observes, 
a general policy of judicial restraint under the dormant Commerce 
Clause "might equally well justify judicial noninterference with 
71. See supra note 64. 
72. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980}; cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., 
Labor & Human Rel. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286-91 (1986} (stating that Congress can 
reverse market-participant rulings). Commentators have differed over whether donnant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence calls for judicial restraint or whether it actually calls for 
judicial activism. Compare Coenen, supra note 62, at 439 (arguing that the possibility of 
congressional preemption does provide a weak "background" justification for judicial re-
straint if other factors counsel a cautious approach} with TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-2, at 404 
(contending that the "blend of judicial and legislative activity" that characterizes dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence actually encourages judicial activism). 
73. See Reeves, 441 U.S. at 441; see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-11, at 434 (stating that 
the market-participant exception "usher[ed] in a new day of federalism"); Coenen, supra 
note 62, at 441 (observing the importance of federalism, experimentation, and "optimal re-
sponsiveness to local concerns"). 
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state regulatory and tax programs that discriminate against inter-
state commerce,"74 but such discriminatory measures are clearly 
unconstitutional. General notions of respect for federalism encoun-
ter the same problem. In a spirit of economic "experimentation," 
states could enact preference laws whose burdensome effects on 
commerce far outweigh the legitimacy of the residents' entitlement 
to state funds. Neither a general policy of judicial restraint or of 
respect for federalism could explain why the Court upheld Boston's 
resident preference law in White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Construction Employers1s and struck down Alaska's primary-manu-
facture requirement in South-Central Timber Development v. 
Wunnicke. 76 
Finally, some commentators have attempted to justify the mar-
ket-participant exception on economic theory grounds. They assert 
that contractual preference laws encourage states to spend re-
sources on public contracts, whereas forcing states to spend their 
funds on nonresiden~s imperils such spending.77 Professor Mark 
Gergen further argues that resident-preference laws can actually 
encourage efficiency because such laws force states to internalize 
the costs of their actions.78 These arguments appear neither com-
pelling nor accurate. Although economic prosperity is an important 
value under the Commerce Clause, the Court has always rejected 
efforts at interstate discrimination when motivated merely by eco-
nomic gain.79 Moreover, resident preferences often cause more 
economic harm than good,80 and are as likely to be the result of 
74. Coenen, supra note 62, at 439. 
75. 460 U.S. 204 {1983). 
76. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
77. See Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1097, 1112 
{1988); see also Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95. 
78. See Gergen, supra note 77, at 1111. 
79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 {1987) {"The Constitution does not require the states to subscribe to any 
particular economic theory."); Thomas K. Anson & P. M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 71, 78 n.31 (1980) 
{"The assumption that the commerce clause embodies a free trade value •.. is erroneous"); 
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Res~ 91 YALE LJ. 425, 434 (1982) 
{"The commerce clause •.. cannot be said to establish and protect free trade or a national 
marketplace as a fundamental constitutional value."). 
80. See supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text. Despite his general encouragement of 
resident preferences, Professor Gergen suggests that resident buying and hiring preferences 
should be per se illegal because they are "impure" subsidies. Gergen, supra note 77, at 1134. 
Unfortunately, he never fully explains this distinction, particularly when he states that prefer-
ence programs like that in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 
204 (1983), "fall well within the principle that a state may limit the benefits of public pro-
grams." Gergen, supra note 77, at 1141. Perhaps his aversion to such preferences derives 
from a concern that they promote political favoritism and undermine basic principles of free 
trade and private ownership: "Would we really permit a socialist government in Vermont to 
defeat free trade by collectivizing its retail establishments, factories, and towns?" Id. at 1143. 
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parochial politics as of rational decisionmaking.81 Hence, it is un-
·likely that such preferences will maximize economic welfare. 
Therefore, the only two rationales that justify the market-par-
ticipant exception and define its scope are the moral and political 
entitlement of state residents to the benefit of state funds and the 
built-in spending restraints of resident preference laws. Applying 
these two rationales may result in judicial restraint and respect for 
federalism on occasion, but these latter two rationales cannot deter-
mine when such restraint or respect is in fact desirable and when it 
is not. 
B. Market-Participant Theory and State-Mandated 
Preference Laws 
Although some state-mandated preference laws may not satisfy 
the two justifications for the market-participant exception - the 
entitlement and built-in restraints rationales - many others will. 
Thus, courts should not categorically reject applying the market-
participant exception to such laws. In the language of the market-
participant cases, some state-mandated laws should be impermissi-
ble "downstream restrictions" while others should be permissible 
"market participation." 
Many state-mandated preference laws have the same legitimacy. 
under the entitlement theory as preference laws that operate on just 
the state level. When local governments spend funds in accordance 
with a state-mandated preference law, those governments are still 
spending money contributed by residents. Professor Coenen has 
argued that the "sow-and-reap" rationale only partially supports 
state-mandated preference laws because the state is not distributing 
money that is "fairly attributable to all residents of the state." In-
stead, he argues that such laws require local governments to spend 
their "own" money in certain ways.82 While this is true, it should 
not be a fatal concern under the dormant Commerce Clause. One 
of the main evils the dormant Commerce Clause exists to prevent is 
discrimination against nonresidents who are politically powerless to 
influence the policies of the discriminating state.83 Residents living 
81. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A State 
frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic 
concerns."); see also Phillips, supra note 61, at 378; Note, Home-State Preferences in Public 
Contracting: A Study in Economic Balkanization, 58 IowA L. REv. 576, 585 (1973); supra 
note 80. 
82. Coenen, supra note 62, at 483 n.497. Professor Coenen also argues that concerns of 
federalism and state experimentation diminish under state-mandated preference laws be-
cause local governments become less able to respond to the local will. Id. He notes, how-
ever, that traditional concerns of federalism surround the state's ability, and not that of local 
governments, to experiment with different policies. Id. 
83. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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under a particular local government, unlike nonresidents of the 
state, are not politically powerless. These residents can petition the ' 
state to eliminate state-mandated preference laws if they feel that 
other residents who have not contributed to local government funds 
are unfairly benefitting from such funds. As long as the state is 
directing funds supplied in some way by residents, rather than tak-
ing funds from nonresidents, then the entitlement rationale should 
still apply. This result is particularly true if the state has supplied 
some or all of the local government's funding. 
Many state-mandated preference laws also do not place a larger 
burden on commerce than a preference law that only applies to the 
state government. There are two ways in which such laws could 
present a greater burden. First, state-mandated preference laws do 
not have as strong a built-in "expensiveness" restraint on their en-
actment. Particularly when the state is directing the expenditure of 
funds raised by local governments, such laws will not be as expen-
sive to the state because it is not spending funds from its own treas-
ury.84 Second, state-mandated preference laws could potentially 
affect a far greater number of contracting parties than merely state-
level preferences because local governments are responsible for 
most public contracting.85 States need not enact state-mandated 
preference laws that operate so broadly, however. There are a 
number of ways to limit the operation of a state-mandated prefer-
ence law that would greatly reduce the burden on interstate com-
merce that such a law might pose, such as imposing geographical or 
temporal limitations on the law.s6 SuGh limitations could produce a 
state-mandated preference law that is far less burdensome than 
state-level preference laws currently upheld under the market-
participant exception. 
Therefore, rather than rejecting state-mandated preferences cat-
egorically, as at least one commentator has advocated,87 courts 
should seek to distinguish between those laws that fit within the 
rationales for the market-participant exception - thus constituting 
84. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 483. 
85. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 73(} F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that 
state-mandated preference laws "could do great damage to the principles of free trade on 
which the negative commerce clause is based" because local governments do far more con-
tracting than state governments). But see Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991): 
It may be true that local municipalities and authorities are responsible for the great bulk 
of sub-national public procurement. However, we find no suggestion in the Supreme 
Court's previous forays into this area that the quantum of market purchases should af-
fect a public entity's qualification for market participant status. 
916 F.2d at 911. 
86. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
Erl. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 483 (arguing tentatively that state-mandated preference 
laws should always violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
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valid "market-participation" - and those that ~o not - thus con-
stituting impermissible "downstream restrictions." Part m refines 
the market-participant exception to handle this task, drawing on 
dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities case law. 
Before that, however, section II.C explains why the current inter-
pretation of the market-participant exception, which focuses on the 
relationship between states and their local governments, fails to dis-
tinguish valid state-mandated preference laws from invalid ones. 
C. Market-Participant Theory and State-Local Relationships 
Under current market-participant doctrine, courts have evalu-
ated the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws based 
on whether they characterize the relationship between a state and 
its local governments as one of dependence or mdependence.88 
Following the traditional approach, courts assume that local gov-
ernments are "creatures of the state" and that states enacting state-
mandated preferences laws "through" them are market-partici-
pants.89 The more contemporary approach requires courts to deter-
mine the actual independence of local governments, calling the 
state a market participant only when it is mandating the contracting 
of dependent local governments.90 Neither approach, however, al-
lows courts to distinguish between legitimate, less burdensome 
state-mandated preference laws and those that excessively burden 
interstate commerce. 
The traditional approach to state-local relationships completely 
fails to evaluate state-mandated preference laws in terms of the jus-
tifications for the market-participant exception. By assuming de-
pendence, this approach concludes that all state-mandated 
preference laws are valid under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
However, some state-mandated preference laws may dictate the use 
of money that is not fairly attributable to the state. In cases in 
which the federal government has provided the lion's share of fund-
ing, or in which nonresidents have contributed to the state's funds 
through taxes and licensing fees, residents do not have the justifica-
tion for favoring themselves in public contracting. Furthermore, 
some preference laws may have such widespread effects that courts 
should strike them down despite any such justification. The tradi-
tional approach to state-local relationships would allow the state to 
tell every single city, county, municipality, school board, or other 
political subdivision, to hire only residents, to buy only goods made 
by residents, and to sell goods made with state funds only to resi-
dents for any length of time and for any reason. The scope of this 
88. See supra section I.e. 
89. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
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preferential treatment would dwarf other forms of discrimination 
that the court has struck down under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.91 
The more contemporary approach to state-local relationships 
does not fare much better. This approach at least condemns some 
state-mandated preference laws as violating the dormant Com-
merce Clause - namely those that act on autonomous local gov-
ernments. The distinction this approach draws, however, has little 
to do with the legitimacy of the state's action or the potential bur-
den on interstate commerce. Moreover, the test for determining 
autonomy is susceptible to manipulation by state legislatures. They 
ultimately control the distribution of power within the state, and 
they could alter the balance whenever they wished to create a "de-
pendent" local government from one that was formerly "autono-
mous."92 Even the best test for determining autonomy in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context would not produce results that 
comport with the justifications for the market-participant excep-
tion. The best test would probably focus on the amount of financial 
support that the state has supplied because residents can definitely 
claim a legitimate entitlement to state funds that are merely spent 
through local governments. Yet, this test would fail to strike down 
91. See supra notes 7, 26 and accompanying text. 
92. Even if courts treated the issue of local government autonomy as a federal one, state 
law would undoubtedly influence their finding. In the areas in which courts already attempt 
to measure local government autonomy, see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text, they 
primarily look to state law for guidance. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1979) (balancing six factors: 1) the state's designa-
tion of the agency; 2) the relative power of appointment between the state and the agency; 3) 
the agency's funding; 4) the nonbinding aspect of the agency's obligations; 5) the agency's 
primary mission; and 6) the state's lack of veto power over agency rules); Mt. Healthy City 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (balancing four factors: 1) the 
state's designation of the school board; 2) the degree of state supervision; 3) the level of state 
funding; and 4) the school board's capacity to generate revenue); see also Alex E. Rogers, 
Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Elev-
enth Amendment Arm-of-State Doctrine, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1243, 1269 (1992) (summarizing 
the factors employed by lower courts into five categories: 1) the entity's functions; 2) the 
degree of state control; 3) the entity's powers, especially fiscal autonomy; 4) the state's 
designation of the entity; and 5) the financial liability of the state for the entity's legal 
violations). 
Another, albeit less important, argument against attempts to measure local government 
autonomy is that such attempts have met with little success. See ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, FED· 
ERAL Juruso1cnoN § 7.4, at 387 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that "the law concerning the [11th 
Amendment] immunity of state agencies, boards, and other entities ••• is quite inconsis-
tent"); Rogers, supra, at 1269 (stating that "the courts craft disparate tests and rely upon 
vague factors, thereby generating conflicting results"). A prime example of such conflict 
occurred when the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals split on whether the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey was a dependent political subdivision or an autono-
mous entity for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1989), affd. on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Port 
Auth. Police Benevolent Assn. v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 
(1987). The Supreme Court eventually decided this issue in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). 
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those state-mandated preference laws that impose excessive bur-
dens on interstate commerce despite the claim of entitlement. In 
addition, this test would fail to allow state-mandated preference 
laws that operate completely on local funding but that pose little 
threat to interstate commerce. 
Ultimately, focusing on the relationship between the state and 
its local governments has little to do with the concerns of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause protects 
legitimate regulations that do not pose an excessive burden to inter-
state commerce. The traditional approach ignores both of these 
concerns. The more contemporary approach, if crafted and applied 
properly, would at least protect the state's legitimate ability to pre-
fer its own residents in some instances, but it does so without any 
reference to the burden on interstate commerce. Therefore, courts 
must develop a different approach to evaluating the constitutional-
ity of state-mandated preference laws that comports with the ratio-
nales for the market-participant exception as identified in this Note. 
III. APPLYING THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO 
STATE-MANDATED PREFERENCE LAWS 
Some commentators have urged courts to apply the market-par-
ticipant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause in a more sub-
stantive manner.93 This Note similarly argues that courts should 
apply the market-participant exception with reference to the ratio-
nales identified in this Note that justify and define the scope of the 
exception. Fortunately, there is already some guidance within the 
law to help craft such an approach. A more substantive approach 
to the market-participant exception can draw upon the Supreme 
Court's long-standing jurisprudence under the dormant Commerce 
Clause and also that of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Privileges and Immuriities Clause doctrine provides a particu-
larly apt analogy to dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, at least 
with respect to issues of interstate economic discrimination. The 
two clauses have similar historical origins.94 In . addition, cases 
93. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 218 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The line between regulation and market 
participation, for purposes of the Commerce Clause, should be drawn with reference to the 
constitutional values giving rise to the market participant exemption itself."); Coenen, supra 
note 62, at 398 (arguing that courts should examine the "competing constitutional values" 
underlying the market-participant cases); Regan, supra note 29, at 1196-97 (arguing that 
courts should engage in line-drawing based on the criteria of whether the state is spending its 
own money in order to determine whether the market-participant applies to a particular state 
activity). 
94. The Framers derived both clauses from the fourth article of the Articles of Confeder-
ation, which was to "secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
people of different States." Th.mE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 537 (quoting ART. CoNFED. art. 
IV); see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (stating that the clauses have a "shared 
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under the Privileges and Immunities Clause recognize that states 
are entitled to favor their own residents when spending residents' 
money.9s Furthermore, these cases also recognize that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause protects against the economic and 
political balkanization that discrimination against nonresidents 
often causes.96 Logically, these cases produce the same balance 
that exists under the dormant Commerce Clause - governments 
can favor their own citizens when they are spending state money 
but they are limited in the extent to which they can do so.97 
vision of federalism"). At least one commentator has argued that the modern dormant Com· 
merce Clause actually fulfills the role envisioned by the Framers for the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause. See Eule, supra note 79, at 446-55; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspectives 
on the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERAUSM, AND INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE 59, 65 (A. Dan Tarlock ed. 1981). But see Regan, supra note 29, at 1202-06 (arguing 
that sufficient distinctions exist between the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause to maintain separate bodies of doctrine). 
There is one significant historical difference between the two clauses. Corporations may 
not sue under the Privileges and Immunities Clause because, under that clause, they do not 
qualify as citizens. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 665 
(1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177, 181 (1869) (suggesting in dicta that the 
term "citizens" in the Privileges and Immunities Clause refers only to natural persons"). But 
see Eule, supra note 79, at 451 (arguing that the "legal underpinnings" of this rule are "no 
longer sound"); Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE LI. 569, 610-11 ("From a policy per-
spective, there can be little doubt that corporations should receive the protection of the privi-
leges and immunities clause."). 
95. Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has allowed states to 
prefer residents in public education, see Martinez v~ Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983}, public wel-
fare programs, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year resi· 
dency requirement for welfare benefits not because of the requirement itself but because of 
its unjustified duration), and hiring for public construction jobs, see United Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). In United Building, the Court 
explicitly recognized this justification: 
The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds it administers in accordance 
with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor - perhaps the crucial factor - to be 
considered in evaluating whether the statute's discnmination violates the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause ...• 
. . . States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing 
appropriate cures." This caution is particularly appropriate when a government body is 
merely setting conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls. 
465 U.S. at 221-23 (citation omitted) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)); 
see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 541 (observing that state creation of a resource or 
other good would remain a powerful argument for justifying discrimination under the Privi· 
leges and Immunities Clause). 
96. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (stating that 
the clause protects the "maintenance or well-being of the Union"); Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975) (stating that the Framers created the clause to safeguard 
"all the privileges of trade and commerce") (quoting ART. CoNFEo. art. IV). 
97. As Professor Tribe observes: 
Police and fire departments are quintessentially creatures of the state, supported by state 
or local revenue and operated for the good of the local citizenry, yet it is inconceivable 
that a state would be permitted to deny police and fire protection to tourists or short· 
term visitors, or to charge a premium to those just passing through for the service of 
extinguishing a blaze or apprehending a hit-and-run perpetrator. Discrimination against 
non-residents with respect to such basic advantages of civilization would surely under· 
mine national cohesion and deter intercourse among the states. 
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Section ID.A describes how courts can refine their approach to 
state-mandated preference laws under the market-participant ex-
ception with guidance from case law under the dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Section ID.B 
then applies this approach to the federal cases that have split on the 
constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws. 
A. A More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant 
Exception 
Any application of the market-participant exception should take 
into account the two rationales that support and define the scope of 
the exception - entitlement and built-in restraints. This approach 
will guarantee that market-participant decisions rest on substantive 
analysis rather than on blind labeling. Moreover, this approach 
conforms naturally to traditional dormant Commerce Clause and 
Privileges and Immunities analysis. 
Because the market-participant exception derives from dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the latter provides a ready guide 
for the former. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis consists of two 
parts. First, courts look for a legitimate purpose for the state regu-
lation.9s Second, they balance the local benefits achieved by the 
regulation against the burden it imposes on interstate commerce.99 
Under the justifications for the market-participant exception, states 
have a legitimate purpose when enacting contractual preferences -
they can prefer residents when they spend funds contributed by 
those residents. Moreover, the built-in restraints on state spending 
make preference laws less likely to burden commerce substantially. 
Thus, on balance, courts should be willing to uphold some prefer-
ence laws, whereas they should always strike down other discrimi-
natory measures, such as discriminatory taxes on nonresidents. The 
Supreme Court has at least implicitly condoned this reasoning in 
the dormant Commerce Clause context by upholding under the 
market-participant exception state laws that prefer residents when 
buying scrap metal,100 selling state-produced cement,101 and hiring 
TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 540-41 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has stated, 
however, that current market-participant' doctrine is not in harmony with current privileges 
and immunities doctrine in this regard. See United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 220 ("This concern with 
comity [under the Privileges and Immunities Clause] cuts across the market regulator-market 
participant distinction that is crucial under the Commerce Clause."). 
98. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
100. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
101. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980). 
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construction workers, 102 while striking down other discriminatory 
regulations that do not involve state spending.103 
Although this balancing approach is merely implicit in the 
Supreme Court's market-participant cases, the Court explicitly per-
forms a similar sort of balancing in the context of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. First, the Court determines whether a state 
regulation burdens a fundamental privilege of nol!l'esidents.104 If 
the regulation does burden a fundamental privilege, the Court will 
still uphold the discriminatory regulation if the state can demon-
strate that nonresidents are a "peculiar source of evil" to residents 
and that the discrimination is substantially related to that evn.10s 
The Supreme Court's decision in United Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden106 applied this analysis to 
the city of Camden's preferential municipal ordinance, which re-
quired at least forty percent of the employees of contractors or sub-
contractors working on city construction projects to be Camden 
residents.107 The Supreme Court determined that the opportunity 
to seek a job with these private employers is " 'sufficiently basic to 
the livelihood of the Nation' as to fall within the purview of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause."1os On the record presented, the 
102. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
103. See supra notes 7, 26. 
104. See Baldwin v. Montana Game & Fish. Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). The concept of a "fundamental privilege" is more expan-
sive than the concept of a "fundamental interest" under other provisions of the Constitution. 
The Equal Protection Clause, for example, defines fundamental interests to include only 
those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to vote, 
see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), or the right of interstate migra-
tion, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Fundamental privileges under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause include many of the same interests, but they also include 
interests such as access to medical services, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); equal 
taxes, see Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975); private jobs, see Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); and "the pursuit of happiness," see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 
Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). 
105. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383; Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398. 
106. 465 U.S. 208 (1984). 
107. See 465 U.S. at 210. Camden enacted the ordinance pursuant to a statewide affirma-
tive action program subject to the State Treasurer's approval. Because of this statewide pro-
gram, the Col!rt stated that the constitutional challenge to the preference law must also " 'be 
interpreted as a challenge to the State Treasurer's general power' to adopt such a prefer-
ence." 465 U.S. at 215 (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 
443 A.2d 148, 154 (N.J. 1983)). Therefore, the Court's analysis arguably applies to state-
mandated preference laws as well. 
108. 465 U.S. at 221-22 (quoting Baldwin v. Montana F"ish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 
371, 388 (1978)). It is unclear whether, in the context of a state-mandated preference law, 
access to public construction jobs should constitute a fundamental privilege. The only court 
to address this issue implicitly held that access to such jobs should constitute a fundamental 
privilege. See W.C.M. Wmdow Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1984). This 
result makes sense, especially when the resident construction workers are actually working 
for private contractors. Even when the construction workers work directly for the govern-
ment, however, access to their jobs should probably constitute a fundamental privilege. 
Otherwise states could merely pay workers directly rather than through contractors and 
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Court would not decide whether economic and social problems in 
Camden justified the preference law.109 The Court definitely im-
plied, however, that some preference laws can survive scrutiny 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.110 
The approach taken by lower courts applying the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to resident-preference laws - and in one case a 
state-mandated preference law111 - provides particularly apt gui-
dance for analyzing such laws under the market-participant excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause. First, these courts examine 
the record for evidence that nonresidents actually pose an eco-
nomic "evil" to residents.112 If the state cannot establish this 
threshold fact, then the court will automatically strike down the 
preference law.113 Next, these courts determine whether the state 
has narrowly tailored an appropriate remedy.114 The test requires a 
close fit between the evil posed by nonresidents and the remedy for 
that evil.115 When courts strike down resident-preference laws, 
generally the state has failed to produce evidence of an evil to be 
corrected or it has failed to narrowly tailor the remedy.116 
As under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, courts should 
carefully scrutinize resident preference laws under the market-
participant exception. First, they should ensure that the state has a 
legitimate basis for the preference - that the state is actually redis-
tributing the residents' money. Then they should demand evidence 
of a positive local benefit that the preference law will achieve be-
yond merely increasing the income of residents.117 For example, 
the preference law might aim temporarily to alleviate serious unem-
avoid the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But see Massachusetts Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) {holding that there is no fundamental right to 
government employment for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause). 
109. The Court remanded the issue, but the case settled before the state court could 
make a final determination of whether sufficient reasons existed for the discrimination. See 
1st Westco Corp. v. School District, 811 F. Supp. 204, 207 (E.D. Pa 1993). 
110. See Gergen, supra note 77, at 1100 n.12 (noting that "the Court [in United Building] 
clearly indicated that hiring preferences for citizens are sometimes permissible"). 
111. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98 (striking down a state-mandated preference 
law because Illinois failed to produce evidence of the evil the state wanted to correct). 
112. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98; 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08. 
113. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98. 
114. See 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08. 
115. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 544 (comparing the Supreme Court's "insistence 
on a fairly precise fit between remedy and classification" to the Warren Court's strict scrutiny 
of Equal Protection and First Amendment issues). 
116. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98; 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08; see also 
Neshaminy Constructors v. Krause, 437 A.2d 733, 737 n.6 (NJ. Ch. 1981), modified on unre-
lated grounds and ajfd., 453 A.2d 1359 (NJ. App. 1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 399 
N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1979); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr., 654 P.2d 67 {Wash. 
1982). 
117. Cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court should first determine whether the state "participated in the market as a pri-
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ployment in a particular geographic area or type of employment, 
such as highway construction, or it might temporarily buy the prod-
ucts of a struggling health-sensitive resident industry, such as milk 
production.118 Furthermore, courts should ensure that a resident 
preference law is reasonably necessary to achieve this benefit. In 
particular, courts should examine whether any less discriminatory 
alternatives exist,119 or whether the state has limited the temporal 
or economic scope of the regulation. For example, the state might 
supply some of the money to operate the preference law, or the law 
might only last for six months, or it might only apply to major urban 
areas or particular industries, or it might limit the percentage of 
purchases or job openings that will favor residents.120 This analysis 
will ensure that states do not enact regulations that unduly burden 
interstate commerce. If the state fails to produce evidence of a suf-
ficient local benefit or if the state fails to narrowly tailor its prefer-
ence law, then a court should strike the law down as a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Otherwise, a court should uphold 
the law under the market-participant exception. 
B. Resolving the Split Between the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
An analysis of the opinions of those circuits that have passed on 
the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws demon-
strates the utility of applying the substantive approach outlined in 
this Note to such laws rather than the current market-participant 
approach. The substantive approach avoids the difficulty of at-
tempting to determine whether a particular local government is de-
pendent upon the state government or whether it in fact retains 
sufficient autonomy. Moreover, the substantive approach allows 
courts to distinguish between state-mandated preference laws that 
comport with the rationales for the market-participant exception 
and those that do not. 
Applying the substantive market-participant exception ap-
proach suggests that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals correctly 
vate firm" and then evaluate whether the state's action "burdens the flow of interstate 
commerce"). 
118. See Dean Mill: Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951} (recognizing that ensuring the 
supply of wholesome milk is a valid state objective). 
119. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 225 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that Boston could have devised less discriminatory alternatives to its resi-
dent preference law). 
120. But see White, 460 U.S. at 217 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("That the order limits the preference to 50% of the covered jobs is, of course, not 
relevant to the applicability of the market participant exemption. If such preferences do not 
implicate the dormant Commerce Clause, they are immune even if they apply to 100% of a 
contractor's jobs."). 
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decided W. C.M. Window Co. v. Bemardi. 121 In this case, the Sev-
enth Circuit struck down a state-mandated preference law requiring 
all contractors with local governments to hire only Illinois residents 
unless such residents were unavailable.122 The court noted that Illi-
nois failed to produce any evidence on the employment rate in Illi-
nois's construction industry, the costs to the state of unemployment, 
the effect of a resident preference on unemployment, or the benefit 
of the preference compared to the inefficiency of not hiring nonres-
idents.123 In addition, the court relied on an uncontradicted affida-
vit that the state did not even partially finance the operation of the 
law as it applied in the case.124 Thus, Illinois failed to adduce any 
evidence of the benefit of the state-mandated preference law, and it 
failed to narrowly tailor the law by supplying some money to the 
local governments or limiting the number of contractors to whom 
the law applied. Although Illinois may legitimately spend its own 
money to benefit residents in some instances, the State failed to 
prove that the benefit of this regulation exceeded its burden on in~ 
terstate commerce. 
The substantive approach to applying the market-participant ex-
ception also suggests that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cor-
rectly decided Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania. 125 In this case, 
the Third Circuit upheld a law that required all local governments 
to buy American-made steel.126 The court's focus on the relation-
ship between the state and its local governments,127 however, dem-
onstrates how that approach ignores the real concerns of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. The real dormant Commerce Clause 
concern implicated in Trojan Technologies was the burden on inter-
state commerce created by the buy-American law. Proper analysis 
of this issue would begin by noting that a buy-American law does 
not discriminate against other states; it merely discriminates against 
foreign commerce. Such a law does not pose a threat to interstate 
commerce. Courts examining state-mandated buy-American laws 
must ensure only that such laws do not unduly burden foreign com-
merce.128 If a state-mandated buy-American law does not unduly 
burden foreign commerce, then a court should always uphold the 
121. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984). 
122. See supra note 14. 
123. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498. 
124. See 730 F.2d at 495. 
125. 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990). 
126. See 916 F.2d at 904-05. 
127. See 916 F.2d at 910-12. 
128. See 916 F.2d at 912-13; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (noting 
in a market-participant case that Commerce aause scrutiny may be higher when foreign 
commerce is involved). 
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law under the market-participant exception to the dormant Com-
merce Clause. 
In Big Country Foods v. Board of Education, 129 the court's deci-
sion seems inconsistent with a more substantive approach to the 
market-participant exception. The Ninth Circuit upheld an Alas-
kan preference statute that required schools receiving funds from 
the state government to buy dairy products harvested in the state, 
despite the fact that the federal government in fact supplied the 
funds for the program.130 Because Alaska did not actually supply 
the funds, it did not have a legitimate entitlement to prefer its own 
citizens.131 Nevertheless, the case provides a good example of how 
a state can diminish the effect on interstate commerce of a state-
mandated preference law. The state limited the program to a single 
group of local government entities - school boards - and to a 
single type of product - milk. Moreover, the state required the 
school boards to buy like-quality, nonresident-harvested milk when 
the price of resident-harvested milk exceeded nonresident prices by 
more than seven percent.132 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should take a more substantive approach to applying the 
market-participant exception to state-mandated preference laws 
rather than focusing on state-local government relationships. This 
substantive approach should recognize the concerns of the dormant 
Commerce Clause - allowing legitimate state regulation while 
preventing undue burdens on interstate commerce - and the legit-
imate justifications for the market-participant exception - prefer-
ring residents with state funds in a manner that poses less risk of 
burdening interstate commerce. First, the court should ensure that 
the preference law applies to the expenditure of state or local resi-
dent funds, rather than federal or nonresident funds. Then, it 
129. 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992). 
130. See 952 F.2d at 1175, 1179-80. 
131. The court expressly rejected this argument under its interpretation of White v. Mas-
sachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). See Big Country, 952 F.2d at 
1179-80; see also Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989}, 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (rejecting, on the basis of White, the argument that federal 
funding made the market-participant exception inapplicable). The court in Big Country 
stated at great length, however, its apparent sympathy with the argument that the use of 
federal funding should make a difference: 
We recognize there are strong public policy arguments to the contrary. It may be 
asserted with some logic that the use of federal as opposed to state or local funding 
allows Alaska to reap what it has not sown; that the underlying commerce clause value 
of a free market is undermined when the federal government in essence subsidizes one 
state's industry; and that a state differs from the usual market participant in that the 
state has the ability to obtain federal subsidies for its purchases. 
952 F.2d at 1180 (citation omitted). 
132. See 952 F.2d at 1175. 
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should examine whether the preference's burden on interstate com-
merce substantially outweighs the state's proffered benefit. If the 
state cannot provide adequate evidence of the benefit, if less dis-
criminatory alternatives exist, or if the burden of the preference law 
is too great, then the court should strike down the law as a violation 
of the dormant Commerce Clause. Otherwise, the court should up-
hold the law under the market-participant exception. 
Ultimately, courts should apply this more substantive market-
participant exception to all resident-preference laws.- The Supreme 
Court's current market-participant jurisprudence implies that 
whenever a state is directly participating in the market by spending 
its own funds, the Court will uphold a discriminatory resident pref-
erence without examining its burden on interstate commerce. The 
limitation posed by the dormant Commerce Clause on the ratio-
nales for the market-participant exception is the same, however, 
whether a preference law operates only on the state government or 
whether it operates on local governments as well - at some point 
even the most justifiable resident preferences can impose an unrea-
sonably high burden on interstate commerce. Adopting the sub-
stantive approach to the market-participant exception for all 
resident-preference laws would bring logic and consistency into this 
area of the law by providing clear guidelines for lower courts and by 
harmonizing market-participant doctrine with existing dormant 
Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence. 
